发表刊物：

Journal of Corporate Finance

关键字：

Company visits Selective access Analyst forecasts Information acquisition Mosaic theory Information chilling effect

摘要：

Following an exogenous regulation change in China, we examine the impact of company visit disclosures on the fairness of market information acquisition. Before July 2012, company visits to Chinese listed firms were vaguely disclosed in annual reports long after they were conducted. After that, they were disclosed in detail within two trading days of their completion. Market reactions around visits are much stronger and more predictive of firms' future earnings if visits occurred after July 2012 and, thus, were disclosed in a timelier and more detailed manner. The timely disclosure of visit details also improves the forecast accuracy of non-visiting analysts, reduces forecast dispersion among analysts, and weakens the relative information advantages of visiting analysts. Because of this, visits are more concentrated on firms with poorer information environments, larger sizes, and manufacturing firms after July 2012, i.e., firms offering visitors larger potential benefits. In summary, the timely disclosure of visit details improves the fairness of information acquisition and decreases information asymmetry while causing information chilling effects for firms that provide fewer potential benefits to visitors.

合写作者：

Lu Jing,Xiang Cheng*

第一作者：

Yang Jun

论文类型：

期刊论文

通讯作者：

Xiang Cheng

学科门类：

经济学

一级学科：

应用经济学

文献类型：

J

卷号：

64

页面范围：

1-24

是否译文：

否

发表时间：

2020-04-15

收录刊物：

SSCI